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IBFVSCOC 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 17 CR 630 (ER) V. 5 MARK S. SCOTT, 6 Defendant. CONFERENCE -----x 7 8 New York, N.Y. November 15, 2018 9 11:03 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. EDGARDO RAMOS, 12 District Judge 13 APPEARANCES 14 15 GEOFFREY S. BERMAN, 16 United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York 17 CHRISTOPHER DiMASE NICHOLAS FOLLY 18 Assistant United States Attorneys JULIETA V. LOZANO 19 Special Assistant United States Attorney 20 DAVID M. GARVIN JAMIE NOBLES 21 Attorneys for Defendant 22 23 24 25

1	(Case called)
2	MR. DiMASE: Yes. Good morning, your Honor.
3	Christopher DiMase, for the government.
4	Also present at counsel table are Special Assistant
5	United States Attorney Julieta Lozano from the Manhattan DA's
6	office, and AUSA Nicholas Folly.
7	THE COURT: Good morning.
8	MS. LOZANO: Good morning.
9	MR. FOLLY: Good morning.
10	MR. GARVIN: Good morning, your Honor.
11	David Garvin, on behalf of Mr. Scott, who is present
12	to my far right.
13	MR. NOBLES: And James Nobles, also present for
14	Mr. Scott.
15	THE COURT: And good morning to you all.
16	I take it that Covington & Burling is out?
17	MR. NOBLES: Judge, we've both been fully retained and
18	will be in the matter for the rest of the case.
19	MR. GARVIN: Yes, your Honor.
20	THE COURT: Okay.
21	This matter is on for a status. So Mr. DiMase, did I
22	pronounce that correctly?
23	MR. DiMASE: Yes, you did, your Honor.
24	THE COURT: Why don't you tell me where we are.
25	MR. DiMASE: Your Honor, we've produced a significant

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quantity of discovery to counsel; it was first produced to Arlo Devlin-Brown at Covington when he was counsel of record. More recently we've been producing the materials to Mr. Garvin.

Ms. Lozano is prepared to speak about the general categories of evidence that we've already turned over. There are a couple of additional significant pieces still remaining, and we're getting them out on a rolling basis.

In particular, there was a substantial amount of digital evidence that was recovered pursuant to search warrants at the time of Mr. Scott's arrest back in September, both from the Florida residence and from the Massachusetts residence. I believe the Florida residence amounted to somewhere in the vicinity of two terabytes of data on a number of devices and computers; and in Massachusetts it's three terabytes of data. So these are really large productions.

We've gotten a two-terabyte drive from counsel; we are copying the Florida data down to that drive and expect to produce it back to counsel very soon.

With the Massachusetts data, it took a little bit longer to process that, but we now have it all imaged. And we have asked for a three-terabyte drive from counsel to copy that data onto the drive and return it to them.

So we are in the process of producing those materials to the defense as we speak.

THE COURT: And assuming you get the drive from the

defendants on a fairly quick basis, when will they have that back?

MR. DiMASE: Well, we already have the two-terabyte drive. I anticipate that will probably go back out to them with the discovery -- with the electronic data from Florida probably next week.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DiMASE: Although with the Thanksgiving holiday, it's possible it could be early the following week. But we'll make our best efforts to get it out for Thanksgiving.

The three-terabyte drive, we don't have the drive yet. We can probably turn it around in a week or two once we have the drive, but we are waiting on the drive from counsel; I expect that they'll get that to us soon. It is a substantial amount of data; my understanding is it does take some time to actually copy it over.

THE COURT: Does it take as long as a week or two?

MR. DiMASE: Well, the data is currently in the

possession of the FBI, not the U.S. Attorney's Office. So I'm

building in a little bit of time to get the drive to the FBI,

get them to copy it, give it back to us, and then get it to

counsel. And I should note, importantly, that these materials

were recovered from his residence. Mr. Scott, as the Court

well knows, was a practicing attorney, still remains barred in

at least one state, and our position is that these materials

also need to be produced to counsel through our privilege filter review team, so that adds an additional step. Not that our review of it will have anything to do with the production of it to counsel, but there are going to be issues around reviewing it through the privilege review team and discussing with counsel various different privilege issues as we go forward.

In addition to those drives, your Honor, there is a set of around 6500 emails that either were sent by, received by, or in one way or another copied Mr. Scott that we have in our databases. Again, there's a mix of potentially privileged materials and nonprivileged materials. We expect to get that production out to counsel later today. And the materials that are potentially privileged will be marked as such, and the nonprivileged materials marked as such, so that that will enable and facilitate the parties discussing the privilege issues, knowing what's what.

THE COURT: How long do you anticipate that that process will take?

MR. DiMASE: You know, your Honor, I don't know exactly what the defense position is going to be on these privilege issues, so it's very hard for me to provide an estimate in that regard.

THE COURT: Okay. But that process is ongoing and you're communicating with defense counsel in that regard?

MR. DiMASE: The one other piece of privileged material that's already been turned over is I think approximately eight boxes of documents that were recovered from the Florida residence that are also in the filter team review process. They already have the scanned copies of those documents. They also have a full copy of the post-arrest statement made by Mr. Scott, whereas the government case team has only received a copy of the filter-reviewed version of that statement.

So those are the potentially privileged materials that have already been turned over. I'll be frank with the Court, we have not yet engaged with counsel regarding privilege issues around those materials, in part because counsel was only recently retained in place of Covington & Burling, and that process took some time. It wasn't clear who exactly was going to be representing Mr. Scott.

I think now that Mr. Nobles and Mr. Garvin are on the case, we can have a discussion around those documents and the statement. And as we produce these drives and the emails, we will obviously have further discussions around those issues as well.

THE COURT: So discovery in this case will likely take at least a couple more months?

MR. DiMASE: I think that's right. And the privilege issues will complicate some of these discovery questions, but

1 we will work as quickly as we can through them, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DiMASE: I did want to say that there are a couple of other pieces of evidence. I want to be clear, and Ms. Lozano is prepared to address this, if necessary, we have produced a massive amount of discovery already; and there just is a very substantial amount of discovery in this matter. I think it's fair to say it's more than enough to keep counsel busy, but we are getting discovery out on a rolling basis as quickly as we can.

In addition to the items I've described, the drives and the emails that are in process, there are some other emails — not, I think, a massive quantity, but a quantity of other emails not copying Mr. Scott or sent or received by Mr. Scott — that we intend to produce, along with a larger collection of bank records. What we've done is to produce the bank records that are really most pertinent to Mr. Scott, the accounts that he controlled or controlled through his companies. And so that, in and of itself, is a very large production.

THE COURT: I forget, what was Mr. Scott's practice?

MR. DiMASE: In terms of his law practice, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DiMASE: I believe he was a transactional lawyer who largely dealt with private equity issues and other legal

issues around that practice area. But he has not been — he was employed by Locke Lord LLP until approximately August of 2016. And since then, he has not been employed by a law firm. Our belief, based on the investigation, is that since then he's primarily been operating these, quote/unquote, hedge funds or private equity funds that were used to facilitate the money laundering scheme. But that has been his main employment, for lack of a better word, since that time.

THE COURT: But the government is acknowledging that even with respect -- or is the government acknowledging that even with respect to those clients, there are privilege issues that need to be addressed?

MR. DiMASE: When you say "clients," your Honor, you're referring to --

THE COURT: The hedge fund.

MR. DiMASE: -- the people who worked with him at the hedge fund?

So I think that, by and large, the government's position is that those transactions were financial in nature and largely not privileged. That being said, there do appear to be occasions where Mr. Scott is either acting in a sort of quasi attorney capacity or connecting members of this fraud scheme with other attorneys who then potentially provide legal advice.

There is a very serious question that we may raise to

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the Court at some point, depending on our conversations with counsel, about whether the crime fraud exception applies to those communications. The privilege review team on our end has already identified a number of emails that may fall into that category; and I think there is an intention, once these emails and other materials are produced, to begin a conversation about defense counsel's position with respect to the privilege and decide whether there is a live issue to bring to the Court or not.

THE COURT: Okav.

MR. DiMASE: But to answer the Court's question more directly, I think largely the answer is no, we believe he was acting primarily as a financial adviser and hedge fund manager, as opposed to a lawyer. But we have reviewed these materials on an individual basis, and the privilege team has made decisions where they view Mr. Scott as acting in a legal capacity, kept those on the other side of the wall from the case team.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DiMASE: So as I was saying with respect to remaining discovery, there are some additional emails, some additional bank records. I don't mean this to be an exhaustive list, but the main categories, along with there are some outstanding Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty requests, some of which are particularly pertinent to Mr. Scott. We just don't

have the materials yet, so we are unable to produce them. We are doing everything we can to expedite those responses. But we're at the mercy of the foreign jurisdictions.

THE COURT: Those MLATs were sent out when approximately?

MR. DiMASE: They vary. The one that is probably most pertinent was to Ireland. And I think that was probably like early 2018, but I don't know the exact date, your Honor; I don't have that in front of me. And I think that there will be a number of emails that are not privileged, because Mr. Scott is communicating with people at the bank, so they are not going to be privileged in any way. Somewhere between 800 and possibly 1,000 emails with that bank that are likely to be quite relevant and we're working to get those as quickly as we can.

THE COURT: When you say "that bank," you mean a bank in Ireland?

MR. DiMASE: The Bank of Ireland --

THE COURT: Bank of Ireland, okay.

MR. DiMASE: Is the bank in question.

So just to give the Court a tiny bit more context, our investigation has demonstrated that Mr. Scott used these hedge funds or private equity funds in the Cayman Islands to receive a lot of these fraud proceeds, and then moved a substantial amount of that money to accounts held by similar entities,

similar private equity fund/hedge fund entities with the same name, Fenero, at the Bank of Ireland. And that is why that evidence may be particularly relevant.

We've turned over all of the records that we've gotten from the Cayman Islands so far that deal with the accounts, his correspondence with the bank and so forth. We've turned over all of the records that we've received from the fund administrator that managed those funds. So defense has all of those records. But we don't have a full production from the Bank of Ireland at this stage.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. DiMASE: You're welcome.

THE COURT: Mr. Garvin or Mr. Nobles?

MR. GARVIN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is it Nobles?

MR. NOBLES: It's Nobles, your Honor.

THE COURT: Nobles. Thank you.

Mr. Garvin.

MR. GARVIN: Your Honor, I would concur with counsel on most everything that counsel just reported to this Court.

Just for clarity's sake, we are not in possession, to my knowledge, of the 6500 emails that relate to Mr. Scott.

That is going to be forthcoming in the near future.

MR. DiMASE: We anticipate producing that probably later today or tomorrow morning, so very soon.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GARVIN: But I do concur with what counsel reported to this Court concerning the importance of those emails and, in fact, that they are likely to raise issues concerning privilege.

With regards to the two-terabyte drive, I also concur that we have provided that upon request, and that it's in the process. And we agree that it seems like the government has been more than reasonable with regard to the production of the two-terabyte drive.

With regard to the three-terabyte drive for the Massachusetts documents, counsel has discussed this issue with me on more than one occasion. And it was only recently that apparently the government was able to determine the actual size, voluminous production. And once they were able to determine that, this week, I believe, on Tuesday they were able to notify me that do not send another two-terabyte drive, you better send a three-terabyte drive.

So I understand, contacting my office this morning, they were in the process of acquiring that and sending it out Federal Express today. So I would hope that it arrives at the United States Attorney's Office tomorrow, but, at the latest, on Monday.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GARVIN: Respectfully, your Honor, I also -- I see

coming in the horizon, not just the snowstorm for today, but any arguments that may take place regarding extra territorial jurisdiction. And I do think that that would probably be best served to be addressed by this Honorable Court as a primary item before we get into what other types of motions the defense might feel are appropriate in this case.

Respectfully --

THE COURT: Extraterritorial issues involving the laws of those particular jurisdictions?

MR. GARVIN: Well, in particular in this case, the application of our laws to transactions that occurred in Ireland, the Cayman Islands, and other locations. I think that there is a dearth of activity in the United States, and I think it may appear that there is less than a de minimis amount of intentional activity. So it may be something that has to be addressed.

Also we need to research into the underlying activity upon which the money laundering charge is based. And in this case, if it is wire fraud, which we anticipate it's likely to be, then we get into an argument perhaps as to the extraterritorial nature of Congress's intent with regard to the wire fraud statute. We've been looking at that tangentially, because we haven't had the discovery to make a determination whether a good-faith basis exists for making these types of arguments.

THE COURT: I haven't looked at the indictment in a little bit, but isn't the specified unlawful activity indicated in there?

MR. GARVIN: I'm sorry, your Honor?

THE COURT: Isn't the specified unlawful activity indicated in the indictment?

MR. GARVIN: Your Honor, I would say it does summarily state specified unlawful activity, but it doesn't indicate what unlawful activity, that is, with the specificity that we believe at this stage we need to look into so as to not waive any of Mr. Scott's rights as to that issue.

MR. DiMASE: Your Honor, I'd like to address a couple of those issues.

THE COURT: Why don't we let Mr. Garvin finish.

MR. DiMASE: Of course.

MR. GARVIN: Yes, your Honor.

There are no pending motions other than one that I very recently filed with regard to a request to modify the condition of bond from a requirement of home detention to a requirement of curfew. But that matter was only recently filed. And I did note in the motion that counsel for the United States has discussed this with me and has expressed that they oppose any such modification.

THE COURT: Let me ask you, since we are all here, why do you need the modification? It seems to me that what he's

allowed to do is fairly expansive. He can do other things, as long as the pretrial officer approves it. What more do you need? Why do you need more?

MR. GARVIN: Yes, your Honor.

The reason why, honestly, one of the main factors was to attempt to protect Mr. Scott from violating the order unintentionally. I will tell you that, for example, the battery on his monitor went dead the other day and he didn't have a replacement battery, and it created much concern on his part. And he has to contact his pretrial services officer, who has a very large quantity of other defendants that he has to monitor. And it makes it sometimes difficult for Mr. Scott to accomplish the contact, get the approval prior to the meeting that is scheduled.

Mr. Scott discussed this with his pretrial services officer. And between the two of them, they said, Well, unfortunately the way that your bond appears, we have to go through this process. And while it may not make a huge amount of difference — and I did come to the same conclusion that this Honorable Court just raised, there doesn't seem to be a big difference here when you read them carefully — it does free up both the supervised release officer — or, excuse me, the pretrial services officer and Mr. Scott as far as the constant notice and constant waiting for a reply.

I don't think that it jeopardizes the government much,

because, as this Court has observed, the way it is written, the pretrial service officer's discretion controls now and would continue to control if the modification was made. So we do not believe it increases any risk of flight; it does not cause prejudice to the United States. And it does relieve the pretrial services officer of having to reply back.

THE COURT: I'm not concerned about the pretrial services officer's workload.

MR. GARVIN: Yes, sir.

Well, that would make it more convenient for Mr. Scott.

And I would say this, your Honor: As counsel has set out for the Court, there is a mountain of discovery in this particular case. And I envision that Mr. Scott is going to be spending an awful lot of time going back and forth to my office.

THE COURT: But as the bond currently exists or as it currently states, he doesn't need approval in order to go to your office.

MR. GARVIN: Well, I can tell you, your Honor, he has been required to seek approval, and I've been filling out the emails and sending them in and waiting for the approval. A position has been taken by the pretrial services office that he needs approval. Even though those items, they are enumerated in the bond, would appear to me to be expressly permitted,

unfortunately, that is what is occurring.

THE COURT: So the pretrial services officer is reading this provision to require advanced approval of him to leave the house to do any of these things?

MR. GARVIN: I believe that is the case, but I can only speak directly to the legal visits, because I've had to prepare the emails requesting permission that he come to my office.

THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. DiMase about this, because this seems to be an easy fix.

Mr. DiMase?

MR. DiMASE: Judge, I think that is the way that the order is intended, actually, to require the pre-approval.

And this speaks to the risk of flight. The idea is that the pretrial officer should know where Mr. Scott is at all times. And it doesn't seem like a huge imposition for Mr. Scott to inform the pretrial officer by email or phone or text message that he's going to meet with his attorney.

Otherwise, the home detention isn't -- or home -- I forget if it's -- home detention isn't really home detention. The point of home detention is to know where Mr. Scott is. So he is either home or the pretrial officer knows where else he might be.

So we would argue that that was the original intent of the order, and that it should remain in place that way.

Mr. Garvin hasn't really expressed any changed circumstance here. I don't think the fact that he needs to charge his battery more regularly represents a changed circumstance that would support a change in bail conditions.

And I do think it increases a risk of flight, I disagree with Mr. Garvin on that point. Home detention is some assurance that we all know where Mr. Scott is. A curfew is just he can do whatever he wants all day long without any approval or pre-approval, and then come home at the end of the day, and he's unaccounted for during that time in between.

I would note also that the battery -- I think the battery and the curfew would be the same problem; he would still have to wear the same GPS device.

THE COURT: I'm not concerned at all about the issue that Mr. Garvin raised about inadvertent violation. At least as far as I'm concerned, if he comes in and he says that he violated for a reason like that, I'm not going to violate him. This can all be handled in a very rational, straightforward, intelligent way. So I'm not concerned about that at all.

I do think that this is an easy fix. As Mr. DiMase has indicated, there's been no change in conditions. As I recall from the bail arguments that were made previously, given the nature of the offense, the amount of money that was involved, and Mr. Scott's contacts in places other than the United States, I'm not going to change the conditions as they

currently stand.

Mr. DiMase, you said you wanted to address some other issues?

MR. DiMASE: Just very briefly, your Honor.

I don't think we've actually had any conversations with Mr. Garvin and Mr. Nobles yet about the jurisdictional issues that were raised today, and that's obviously fine.

Just to be clear -- and we can litigate this in motion practice -- Mr. Scott is living here in the United States during the entirety of this conspiracy and committed the crimes from the United States. There are many, many instances of money flowing through these accounts, out and into these accounts from the United States and into the United States.

Actually, I don't think the indictment alleges this, but there's also evidence that he brought a substantial amount of the proceeds of the crime into the United States, and then used those monies to make purchases, fund bank accounts, and so on and so forth. So it is our position that there is ample jurisdictional evidence here.

But to the extent that this is -- and briefly on wire fraud, your Honor, the government makes the same argument.

There are ample -- there are many, many instances of U.S. victims wiring money to this fraud scheme from within the United States and being defrauded as a result.

THE COURT: Is that the specified unlawful activity?

MR. DiMASE: That's what I was going to address, your Honor.

So we looked at the indictment. The indictment does very specifically indicate that the Ponzi scheme, the pyramid scheme at issue here is the underlying specified unlawful activity, but doesn't say specifically "wire fraud." And we're happy to send an email or a bill of particulars to Mr. Garvin and Mr. Nobles indicating that our theory at this stage is that it is a wire fraud. We may obviously go back and add some additional theory, but that is the theory that we are relying on in the indictment as charged now.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DiMASE: And I do think that it may make sense, to the extent that there is a jurisdictional argument here, for that to be litigated relatively early on in a motion to dismiss. And we are happy to -- once they've had a chance to review the discovery materials -- make a determination on these different fronts.

THE COURT: Right. It's probably not going to be quick.

MR. DiMASE: But I take Mr. Garvin's point that it makes sense to try to resolve this early on, because it seems to be a threshold matter that we need to address.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. DiMASE: But I would submit to the Court that

there is ample evidence here of U.S. jurisdiction on both the 1 money laundering offense itself and the underlying specified 2 3 unlawful activity. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Garvin, anything else you wanted to 5 address? 6 MR. GARVIN: No, your Honor, other than I was going to 7 respectfully ask the Court if perhaps we could have another -roll this status over or have another status scheduled sometime 8 9 in the near future. But I was going to specifically ask the 10 Court -- because I did have the benefit of hearing the case in 11 front of us being rescheduled -- if the case could be -- or the 12 status could be after February 4th. Both myself and 13 independently Mr. Nobles have trials in January. 14 THE COURT: I'll see you as soon as you want to be 15 seen. So after February 4th? 16 MR. GARVIN: Yes, sir. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Rivera? 18 And I'm sure you'll all be very busy between now and 19 then. 20 THE DEPUTY CLERK: February 20 at 11:30 a.m. 21 MR. DiMASE: That's fine with the government, your 22 Honor. Thank you. 23 Does that work for you all, Mr. Garvin? 24 MR. GARVIN: It works for me.

MR. NOBLES: Yes.

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THE COURT: Very well. 1 2 Mr. DiMase, anything else that we need to do today? 3 MR. DiMASE: Just one moment, your Honor, if you 4 would. 5 THE COURT: Sure. MR. DiMASE: Thank you. 6 7 (Pause) MR. DiMASE: Your Honor, just one final matter. 8 9 The government would request the exclusion of speedy 10 trial time from today until February 20th, to enable the 11 parties -- or the government to continue producing discovery to 12 the defense, for the defense to review those materials, make 13 determinations regarding potential motions, and to allow the 14 parties to engage in possible discussions regarding resolution 15 of the case. And finally, I would add, to discuss the ongoing potential privilege issues in this matter as well. 16 17 THE COURT: Mr. Garvin? 18 MR. GARVIN: There is no objection, your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Very well. 20 I will exclude the time between now and February 20 21 under the Speedy Trial Act. I find that Mr. Scott's interest 22 outweigh the interests of the public in a speedy trial for the 23 reasons set forth on the record by Mr. DiMase. 24 And unless there's anything else, we're adjourned.

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